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Abstract
This paper develops and estimates a new-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) model for the analysis of fiscal policy in the UK. We find that government
consumption and investment yield the highest GDP multipliers in the short-run, whereas
capital income tax and public investment have dominating effect on GDP in the long-
run. When nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound, consumption taxes and
public consumption and investment are found to be the most effective fiscal instruments
throughout the analysed horizon, and capital and labour income taxes are established
to be the least effective. The paper also shows that the effectiveness of fiscal policy
decreases in a small open-economy scenario and that nominal rigidities improve effec-
tiveness of public spending and consumption taxes, whereas decrease that of income
taxes.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal policy has been used extensively for a long time to stabilise the economy and
to foster more efficient, fairer and equitable societies. This is among the reasons why
there exists a long tradition in the analysis of fiscal policy in the UK. It was at the
heart of the revenue neutral tax exercise of Ramsey (1927) and macroeconomic analysis
of Keynes (1936). Following these works was a path-breaking analysis on the optimal
tax rule by Mirrlees (1971). In practical terms, the Institute of Fiscal Studies published
Meade (1978) on the burden of direct taxes and Mirrlees et al. (2010) on both direct
and indirect taxes. Whereas the macro impacts of fiscal policy have been studied using
various analytical frameworks (Holly and Weale, 2000; NIESR), the burden of direct and
indirect taxes on households in terms of the Hicksian equivalent and compensating vari-
ations in the welfare taxes to households have been measured using a general equilibrium
analysis (Bhattarai and Whalley, 1999). Tax-benefit models have been used to measure
the impacts of taxes and benefits on the labour supply (Brewer et al., 2009). The Green
Budgets of the IFS have regularly reported on the impacts of taxes on economic growth,
inequality, and welfare. The conclusions of the most of above studies are mainly derived
from comparative static analysis. This paper applies a dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model (DSGE) for an extensive analysis of the dynamics implied by fiscal policy
instruments and multiplier effects, both on the revenue and spending side of the UK’s
government.
The UK economy has been growing secularly in the past several centuries but is
frequently disturbed by transitional shocks arising either from the demand or supply
side, or from both sides of the economy. The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models aim to assess the impacts of such shocks on the transitional dynamics of the
economy. Despite a fairly large body of the literature on DSGE models, few studies
analyse the impacts of such shocks in the UK. Doing so are among others Batini et
al. (2003), the Bank of England Quarterly Model (BEQM) by Harrison et al. (2005),
DiCecio and Nelson (2007), Faccini et al. (2011), Gorts and Tsoukalas (2011), Harrison
and Oomen (2010), and Millard (2011).1 The analysis of fiscal policy is however ignored
by the above papers.2 We fill this gap through an extensive analysis of business cycle
effects of fiscal policy in the UK.
The fiscal stimulus, a growing debt-to-GDP ratio and the budget deficit have brought
much attention in the recent years. Some of the developments in the analysis of fiscal
policy by means of the DSGE models include: Coenen and Straub (2005), Lopez-Salido
1In the context of theoretical model specifications, DiCecio and Nelson (2007) estimate the closed-
economy model of Christiano et al. (2005) on the UK data. Harrison and Oomen (2010) estimate the
open-economy model similar to Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003), and Adolfson et
al. (2008). Faccini et al. (2011) implement a search and matching framework into a labour market
of a medium-size DSGE model. Millard (2011) extends the Harrison and Oomen (2010) model and
incorporates three consumption goods: non-energy output, petrol and utilities. Gorts and Tsoukalas
(2011) fit two separate sectors that produce consumption and investment good into a medium-size
DSGE model.
2The only exception to this are Harrison et al. (2005) and Harrison and Oomen (2010) who analyse
only the effects of government consumption shocks.
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and Rabanal (2006), Gali et al. (2007), Forni et al. (2009), Ratto et al. (2009), Cogan et
al. (2010), Leeper et al. (2010b), Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertson (2011), Drautzburg
and Uhlig (2011), Coenen et al. (2013). In the context of fiscal policy, models by
Coenen and Straub (2005) and Gali et al. (2007) focus primarily on the implications
of government spending, and deficit is adjusted using lump-sum taxes. Our paper can
be easily distinguished from Forni et al. (2009), Ratto et al. (2009), Lopez-Salido and
Rabanal (2006), in the context of fiscal policy specification, its granularity, or the analysis
conducted. Coenen et al. (2013) focus on the implications of European Economic
Recovery Plan (EERP), whereas Cogan et al. (2010) and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011)
on the the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Christiano et al. (2011)
and Eggertson (2011) study the effects of fiscal stimulus at the zero lower bound. The
fiscal policy setup in this paper follows that in Leeper et al. (2010b). The models used
for the analysis differ however substantially. In contrast to Leeper et al. (2010b) we
incorporate the interaction between the fiscal and monetary policies. We also make the
distinction between productive and non-productive government spending, introduce into
the model non-Ricardian households and nominal frictions in prices and wages. Finally,
the model also clearly differs from the long-run growth analysis contained in multi-
household and multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium models with perfect foresight
as presented in Bhattarai (2007) and staggered-price dynamic general equilibrium model
with overlapping generations in Ascari and Rankin (2013).
This study aims to address several questions in the context of UK economy: (1) what
are the qualitative and quantitative effects of distortionary taxation (on consumption and
on labour and capital income) and government expenditure (consumption, investment
and transfers) on the key macroeconomic variables? (2) how in the historical context has
fiscal policy been used in controlling for debt and the output gap? (3) which nominal
and real frictions present in the economy are crucial for determining the fiscal policy
effectiveness? (4) what is the role of the open-economy setup and the imposition of the
zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate for the fiscal policy effectiveness?
To answer the above questions, we use a new-Keynesian DSGE model estimated
with Bayesian methods on a linearly detrended quarterly macro time series ranging
from 1987:Q2 to 2011:Q1.
The results indicate that government consumption and investment shocks are the
most stimulating in the short-run (the impact multiplier totals 0.97 and 1.08 respectively,
thus on impact a 1% increase in public consumption leads to a 0.97% increase in GDP
and a 1% increase in public investment leads to a 1.08% increase in GDP). In the
longer horizon the capital income tax and the public investment shock result in the
highest multipliers (the present value cumulative 5 year multiplier totals -0.52 and 0.72
respectively). The government consumption impact multiplier obtained in this study is
higher than the average impact multiplier of 0.89 obtained in the empirical study of fiscal
policy in the UK conducted by Canova and Pappa (2011). The government transfers
shock results in a relatively lower multiplier when compared to the remaining fiscal
policy instruments. The consumption and labour income tax shocks result in moderate
multipliers in the short and longer horizon ranging from (-0.17) to (-0.56). Additionally,
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we find public and private consumption to be Edgeworth substitutes. Also under the
open-economy scenario public consumption and investment remain the most stimulating
instruments in the short-term, public investment and capital income taxes in the longer
term and transfers yield the smallest multipliers when compared with other fiscal policy
instruments. When the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound the effectiveness
of consumption taxes and public expenditure instruments increases, but decreases that
of capital and labour income taxes.
We also show that non-Ricardian households make the fiscal policy more effective,
and that nominal rigidities improve effectiveness of public spending and consumption
taxes, whereas decrease effectiveness of income taxes.
Finally, the parameter estimates indicate that public investment, consumption and
capital taxes play a decisive role in controlling for the government debt over the sample
period. Additionally, capital income tax rates and government investment characterise
significant procyclical responses to GDP. In contrast, the response of labour income taxes
to aggregate output and debt is relatively modest.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a theoretical model of
the UK economy. Section three outlines the necessary information on the solution and
estimation methods along with the discussion of calibrated parameters, priors, posterior
estimates, and the role of frictions. In section four, we discuss the impulse-responses and
present value multipliers implied by the fiscal policy shocks. In section five we extend
model to other scenarios including the public consumption in the utility function, opening
the economy for international trade and setting the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate as appropriate to the recent experience of the monetary policies. Section
six concludes.
2 Specification of a DSGE model for fiscal policy analysis
The model economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by ι, where,
following Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Mankiw (2000), a share ϑ of them com-
prise non-Ricardian or rule-of-thumb consumers (indexed by m) who do not have access
to the financial and capital markets and simply consume their total disposable income
stemming from labour and transfers. The remaining proportion (1− ϑ) comprise Ricar-
dian consumers (indexed by n), who anticipate and internalise the government’s tax and
borrowing behaviour and maximise their life-time utility subject to their intertemporal
budget constraint. They own the entire capital stock of the economy and possess access
to the financial and capital asset markets. Firms produce differentiated goods, choose
labour and capital inputs and set prices similarly to the method proposed by Calvo
(1983).
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule,
whereas the fiscal authority determines a set of policy instruments’ rules in which they
respond to cyclical changes in output and debt. This model features a number of real and
nominal frictions as found in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005).
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2.1 Preferences of Ricardian households
The utility function of each Ricardian household is represented by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
εBt β
t
((
Cnr,t −Hr,t
)1−σc
1− σc −
εLt
1 + σl
(
Lnr,t
)1+σl) (1)
where the subjective discount factor β satisfies 0 < β < 1; σl > 0 denotes the inverse
Frisch elasticity of labour
(
Lnr,t
)
; σc > 0 denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption
(
Cnr,t
)
; and Hr,t denotes the external habit variable such
that Hr,t = hCr,t−1, where 0 < h < 1. εBt represents the preference shock and εLt
represents the shock to the labour supply. The shocks follow:
ln εBt = ρB ln ε
B
t−1 + η
B, and ln εLt = ρL ln ε
L
t−1 + η
L,
where ηB and ηL are i.i.d. processes with standard deviations σB, and σL. Each Ricar-
dian household maximises its lifetime utility subject to the flow budget constraint, which
simply states that the household’s total expenditure on consumption
(
Cnr,t
)
, investment
in physical capital
(
Inr,t
)
and accumulation of one-period government bonds
(
bnr,t
)
must
equal the household’s total disposable income
(
incnr,t
)
.
bnr,t −
bnr,t−1
pit
+ Inr,t + (1 + τ
c
t )C
n
r,t = inc
n
r,t (2)
where pit denotes the gross inflation rate. The presence of consumption tax τ
c
t implies
that the wedge arises between the consumer and producer prices. We follow the devel-
opments of Woodford (1996), and subsequently Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al.
(2005) and assume complete markets for the state contingent claims in consumption and
in assets but not in labour. Consequently, consumption and asset’s holdings are equal
across all Ricardian households.
The total real disposable income of each Ricardian household consists of: (1) the after
tax labour income
(
1− τ lt
)
wnr,tL
n
r,t, where w
n
r,t represents the real wage rate, and τ
l
t is the
effective labour income tax rate; (2) the after tax capital income
(
1− τkt
)
rk,tu
n
tK
n
r,t−1,
where rk,t denotes the real rate of return on capital, K
n
r,t−1 denotes the physical stock of
capital, and unt is the capital utilisation rate, and τ
k
t is the effective capital income tax
rate; 3 (3) the income from profits Profnr,t; (4) lump-sum government transfers (TR
n
r ),
(5) the interest income from the bond holdings
(
(Rt−1−1)bnr,t−1
pit
)
, where Rt−1 denotes the
nominal interest rate on a one-period bond.
Physical capital accumulates in accordance with the following4:
3Each household while setting the level of capital utilisation rate incurs a cost equal to(
1− τkt
)
a(unt )K
n
r,t−1. We assume that
a′′(unt )
a′(unt )
= κ. Consequently, only the dynamics of the model
depend on the parameter κ. In the steady state u = 1.
4The omission of the subscript n reflects our assumption of complete markets for the state contingent
claims in assets which implies that asset’s holdings are the same among households.
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Kr,t = (1− δk)Kr,t−1 + Ft (Ir,t, Ir,t−1) (3)
where as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006): Ft (Ir,t, Ir,t−1) =
[
1− S
(
εIt Ir,t
Ir,t−1
)]
Ir,t.
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Ricardian households maximise their utility subject to the flow budget constraint, the
capital accumulation function, and the demand for labour they face from the labour
unions.
First-order conditions of Ricardian households
The combination of first-order conditions with respect to consumption and bonds
results in a standard Euler equation:
Ur,c,t = Et
[
Rt
pit+1
(1 + τ ct )(
1 + τ ct+1
)βUr,c,t+1] (4)
where Ur,c denotes the marginal utility of consumption: Ur,c,t = ε
B
t (Cr,t −Hr,t)−σc . The
left-hand side of equation (4) represents the marginal utility cost of investing in bonds
(to invest household sacrifices current consumption). The right-hand side implies that
investing in bonds provides an ex ante real rate of return represented by Rtpit+1 .
The first-order condition with respect to the capital utilisation rate, presented in
equation (5), indicates that the real rental rate net of capital taxes is equal to the
marginal cost of capital utilisation:(
1− τkt
)
rk,t = a
′(ut) (5)
A higher rate of return on capital or a lower capital tax rate implies a higher utilisation
rate up to the point where extra benefits are equal to extra costs. Equation (5) implies
also that the utilisation rate is equal across all the Ricardian households (un = u).
The first-order condition with respect to capital links the shadow price of capital (Q)
between two periods:
Qt =
Etpit+1
Rt
Et
[
Qt+1(1− δk) +
(
1− τkt+1
)
(rk,t+1ut+1)− a(ut+1)
]
(6)
Equation (6) implies that price of capital is simply a present value of future net income
from capital holdings. The price of capital depends positively on the expected price of
capital, real rental rate and the utilisation rate. It depends negatively on the real ex
ante interest rate, expected capital taxes and the capital utilisation cost.
The first-order condition with respect to investment is presented in equation (7).
The left-hand side of the equation represents the marginal utility cost of investment in
physical capital, which is equal to the marginal utility cost of investment in bonds.6 An
5S
(
εIt Ir,t
Ir,t−1
)
= φk
2
(
εIt Ir,t
Ir,t−1 − 1)
2 denotes a function specifying the investment adjustment cost. The
function possesses the following properties: S (1) = S′ (1) = 0, and S′′ (1) = φk > 0, where εIt is
an investment efficiency shock which follow: ln εIt = ρI ln ε
I
t−1 + η
I where ηI is an i.i.d. process with
standard deviation σI .
6λt is a Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint and is equal to: λt =
Ur,c,t
(1+τct )
.
5
increase in investment by one unit at time t leads to an increase in the value of capital
by QtF
′
t (Ir,t, Ir,t−1) in period t, and by Qt+1βF ′t+1 (Ir,t+1, Ir,t) in period t+ 1.7
λt = QtλtF
′
t (Ir,t, Ir,t−1) + βEt
[
Qt+1λt+1βF
′
t+1 (Ir,t+1, Ir,t)
]
(7)
2.1.1 Non-Ricardian households
Non-Ricardian households do not save; they simply consume current, after tax income,
which comprises transfers from the government, and after tax labour income.
(1 + τ ct )C
m
nr,t =
(
1− τ lt
)
wmnr,tL
m
nr,t + TR
m
nr,t (8)
2.2 Wage setup
In creating the wage setup, we follow Erceg et al. (2000) and Benigno and Woodford
(2006). We assume the existence of a competitive labour aggregator, whose only task
is to transform households’ differentiated labour into a composite labour good. The
composite labour is subsequently supplied to monopolistic producers. The aggregator
takes every household’s wage, W ιt , as given and maximises profit represented by:
ProfL,t = WtNt −
∫ 1
0
W ιtL
ι
tdι (9)
where Lιt denotes the amount of labour supplied by a household ι to the union, Wt is
the aggregate wage index, and Nt denotes the labour index: Nt =
[
1∫
0
(Lιt)
ν−1
ν dι
] ν
ν−1
,
where ν > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated labour inputs.
Profit maximisation results in the demand for the labour of a household ι:
Lιt =
(
W ιt
Wt
)−ν
Nt (10)
The aggregate wage index is given by: Wt =
[∫ 1
0 (W
ι
t )
1−ν dι
] 1
1−ν
.
Ricardian households set nominal wages similarly to a staggered-price mechanism in
Calvo (1983). In particular, within each period a fraction of forward-looking households
($w) are unable to adjust their wage rate. These households simply follow the partial
indexation rule and set the wage in accordance to: W ιr,t = pi
γw
t−1W
ι
r,t−1. The remaining
fraction of households (1−$w) that are able to set their nominal wages, maximise their
utility subject to the budget constraint and the demand for labour from the labour
unions.8 The maximisation results in equation (11).
7Note that F ′t (1) = 1 and F
′
t+1 (1) = 0, thus the steady-state does not depend on the parameter φk
and Q = 1.
8All households that are able to set their nominal wage, choose the same wage (for evidence see
Christiano et al. 2005).
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Et
∞∑
l=0
(β$w)
l Lnr,t+lλt+l
{
W˜r,tXtl
Pt+l
Ur,c,t+l(
1 + τ ct+l
) − ν
(1− ν)
Unr,l,t+l(
1− τ lt+l
)} = 0 (11)
where Xtl = pit ∗ pit+1 ∗ ... ∗ pit+l−1 for l > 1 and Xtl = 1 for l = 0 as in Altig et
al. (2005). W˜r,t denotes the wage rate set by households that can re-optimise their
wages at time t. As shown in Christiano et al. (2005) and Erceg et al. (2000) all
households that can re-optimise their wage choose the same wage rate W˜r,t, therefore
lack of indexation n9. The first-order condition implies that Ricardian households set
their wages so that the present value of the marginal utility of income from an additional
unit of labour is equal to the markup over the present value of the marginal disutility
of working. When all households are able to negotiate their wage contracts each period,
wage becomes:
W˜r,t
Pt
= ν(1−ν)
Ur,l,t(1+τ
c
t )
Ur,c,t(1−τ lt)
. Finally, the Ricardian households wage index
can be transformed into the following:
Wr,t =
[
(1−$w) W˜ 1−νr,t +$w
(
piγwt−1Wr,t−1
)1−ν] 11−ν
(12)
For simplicity, we follow Erceg et al. (2006) and assume that each non-Ricardian
household sets its wage equal to the average wage of optimising households, therefore
(Wt = Wr,t = Wnr,t). Because all households face the same labour demand, the labour
supply of a non-optimizing household is equal to that of forward-looking household
(Lt = Lr,t = Lnr,t).
2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Composite consumption good producer
The competitive producer of the composite good (Yt) purchases differentiated goods
(Yj,t) from monopolistic producers indexed by j and combines them into one single good
using the following technology: Yt =
[∫ 1
0 Y
s−1
s
j,t dj
] s
s−1
, where s > 0 denotes the elas-
ticity of substitution among the differentiated outputs of intermediate firms. Producer
maximises profit as follows:
ProfF,t = PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pj,tYj,tdj (13)
where Pt denotes price of a unit of output and Pj,t denotes a price of intermediate output
J . the first-order condition results in a demand function for intermediate goods:
Yj,t =
(
Pt
Pj,t
)s
Yt (14)
9The omission of the subscript n in the utility of consumption Uc reflects our assumption of complete
markets for the state contingent claims in consumption which implies that consumption, and therefore
utility of consumption are the same among all Ricardian households
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The zero profit condition implies that the price index is represented by the following
equation: Pt =
[∫ 1
0 P
1−s
j,t dj
] 1
1−s
.
2.3.2 Intermediate good production sector
Each monopolistic intermediate producer uses the following production function:
Yj,t = ε
A
t (K¯j,t−1)
αN1−αj,t (Kg,t−1)
αg − fc (15)
where fc denotes a fixed cost of production, Kg denotes public capital, K¯j,t−1 denotes
capital services
(
K¯t = utKt
)
, and εAt is a total factor productivity shock which follows:
ln εAt = ρA ln ε
A
t−1 + η
A,
where ηA is an i.i.d. process with standard deviation σA
10. Firms rent capital services(
K¯j,t−1
)
and labour (Nj,t), for which they pay respectively a nominal rental rate (Rk,t)
and a wage rate (Wt). Monopolistic companies minimize costs subject to the technology
available. From the combination of first-order conditions, we obtain the wage rental ratio
(equation 16), which implies that the capital to labour ratio across all of the monopolistic
producers remains the same.
K¯t
Nt
=
K¯j,t
Nj,t
=
α
(1− α)
Wt
Rk,t
(16)
The nominal marginal cost is represented by the following:
Ptmct = (
1
1− α)
1−α(
1
α
)α
(
εAt
)−1
K
−αg
g,t−1(Wt)
1−α(Rk,t)α (17)
The marginal cost, the same across all the intermediate producers, increases as the wage
rate and the rate of return on capital increase. A positive total factor productivity shock
along with an increase in public capital leads to a decrease in the marginal costs.
Price setting
The profit of an intermediate firm j is given by the following equation:11
Profj,t = Pj,tYj,t −mctPt (Yj,t + fc) (18)
Intermediate good producers set prices similarly to the mechanism presented in Calvo
(1983). In particular, during every period, a share of these firms ($p) is not able to
reoptimise their price. These firms simply follow the partial indexation rule: Pj,t =
pi
γp
t−1Pj,t−1. The remaining fraction of companies (1−$p) choose Pt to maximise the
profits subject to the demand (equation 14). Maximisation results in equation (19) for
newly optimised prices:
10Similarly to Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), Coenen et al. (2013) we incorporate
fixed cost in production. This allows for a realistic level of economic profits in the steady-state.
11Equation (18) implies that for profits to be equal zero in the steady-state: fc = (1−mc)
mc
Y .
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Et
∞∑
l=0
(β$)lλt+l
[
P˜tXtl
Pt+l
− s
1− smct+l
]
Pt+lYj,t+l = 0 (19)
where P˜t denotes the price set by firms that can re-optimise their price at time t. In the
case that all firms are allowed to reoptimise their prices, the above condition reduces
to: P˜t =
s
s−1Ptmct, which indicates that the optimised price is equal to a markup over
the marginal costs. In addition, (β$)lλt+l denotes a discount factor of future profits for
firms. Here, λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the Ricardian household’s budget
constraint and is treated by firms as exogenous. The price index Pt =
[∫ 1
0 P
1−s
j,t dj
] 1
1−s
can be rewritten as:
Pt =
[
(1−$) P˜ 1−st +$
(
pi
γp
t−1Pt−1
)1−s] 11−s
(20)
2.4 Fiscal and monetary policies
Equation (21) provides the government budget constraint, which requires the total ex-
penditure of government on consumption (G), investment (IG), transfers, and the re-
payment of last-period debt with interests, to be equal to the revenue from taxes and
new bond issuance.
τ ct Ct + τ
l
twtLt + τ
k
t rk,tutKt−1 + bt =
(
Rt−1
pit
)
bt−1 +Gt + IGt + TRt (21)
The public capital accumulation equation is represented by:
Kg,t = (1− δk,g)Kg,t−1 + IGt (22)
where δk,g denotes depreciation rate of public capital. Fiscal policy instruments rules
are set similarly to those used by Leeper et al. (2010b). First, expenditure instruments
respond countercyclically to GDP deviations from the steady-state, whereas taxes re-
spond to them procyclically. As a consequence fiscal instruments play a role of automatic
stabilizers. Second, fiscal instruments keep real debt dynamics under control in order
not to allow for high debt to GDP ratios.12 Six fiscal instruments are linked to the debt
level and GDP as follows:13
xˆt =−φb,xbˆt−1 − φy,xYˆt + εXt (23)
zˆt = φb,z bˆt−1 + φy,zYˆt + εZt (24)
where εX and εZ denote respectively fiscal shocks which follow:
ln εXt = ρX ln ε
X
t−1 + η
X , and ln εZt = ρZ ln ε
Z
t−1 + η
Z ,
12Romer and Romer (2010) find for example that most of the tax changes in the USA are motivated
by: (1) a change in government spending, (2) other factors likely to affect output in in the close future,
(3) budget deficit, (4) higher growth.
13Hats over variables denote deviations from the steady-state.
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where ηX and ηZ are i.i.d. processes with standard deviations σX and σZ , X ∈
{G, IG, TR}, and Z ∈ {τ c, τk, τ l}.14 Finally, we follow the approach set in the monetary
policy literature, and assume that the shocks in the above fiscal policy rules constitute
an unexpected changes in policy which is an analogous approach to errors in the case of
Taylor rule, (see for example Forni et al., 2009 and Leeper et al., 2010b).
Nominal interest rate follows a Taylor type rule that links it to its own lag term,
inflation and output gap as measured by coefficients ρ, ρpi, and ρy:
Rˆt = ρRˆt−1 + (1− ρ) ρpipˆit + (1− ρ) ρyYˆt + ηMt (25)
where ηMt denotes an i.i.d. normal error term on the interest rate rule.
2.5 Aggregation and market clearing
The aggregate quantity, expressed in per-capita terms, of any household quantity variable
Zιt , is represented by Zt =
∫ 1
0 Z
ι
tdι = (1−ϑ)Zr,t+ϑZnr,t, as all members of each household
type choose identical allocations in equilibrium. Subsequently:
Ct = ϑCnr,t + (1− ϑ)Cr,t (26)
Lt = ϑLnr,t + (1− ϑ)Lr,t (27)
TRt = ϑTRnr,t + (1− ϑ)TRr,t (28)
where Lt = Lr,t = Lnr,t as explained in Subsection 2.2, and TRt = TRnr,t = TRr,t by
definition. Because only Ricardian households accumulate financial and physical assets,
and are the only recipients of profits in the model economy, we obtain the following
conditions for the per-capita investment, physical capital, public bonds and profits:
It = (1− ϑ) Ir,t (29)
Kt = (1− ϑ)Kr,t (30)
bt = (1− ϑ) br,t (31)
Proft = (1− ϑ)Profr,t (32)
The labour market is in equilibrium when the total labour demanded by the interme-
diate firms equals total labour supplied by households at a wage rate (Wt). The capital
rental market is in equilibrium when capital supplied by Ricardian households is equal
to the capital demanded by intermediate producers at a market rental rate (Rk,t). The
final goods market is in equilibrium when the aggregate supply equals the aggregate
public and private demand for consumption and investment goods.
Yt −
(
1− τkt
)
a(ut)Kt−1 = Ct +Gt + It + IGt (33)
Log-linearized equations describing the equilibrium of the model are presented in the
on-line Appendix.
14We have estimated model with fiscal policy responding to one-period lagged output, but it yields a
lower marginal likelihood than the benchmark scenario.
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3 Bayesian Estimation
We use perturbation techniques to solve the models and Bayesian methods to estimate
them15. Sims’s csminwel function is used as the optimiser for the mode’s computation.
In order to determine whether multiple modes exist, we have conducted at least 20
searches for the mode using various starting values. With the exception of few cases
where the numerical optimization procedure failed to converge, the searches for the
posterior mode converged to the same parameter and likelihood values. In the second
stage, using the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm we construct the posterior
distribution. We generate four Markov chains of length 500,000. The acceptance ratios
yields approximately 0.25, which is in line with the range of ratios proposed in the
literature (see for example Gelman et al., 1997).
In the benchmark estimation, we use twelve data series for the period from 1987:Q2
to 2011:Q1. The length of the sample period is determined by the availability of the tax
data. The time series used in the estimation comprise per capita: private consumption,
GDP, private investment, hours, wages, inflation, government consumption, government
investment, transfers, and effective tax revenue from consumption, labour and capital
(see the Appendix for more details on dataset).
3.1 Calibration
Most of the parameters related to the steady-state are calibrated and their values are
presented in Table ??. The discount factor (β) is set to 0.99 as in Harrison and Oomen
(2010), which implies a steady-state annual real interest rate of 4 per cent. We fix the
depreciation rate of public capital (δg) at 0.015, which results in an annual depreciation
rate of public capital of 6 per cent. This value together with the ratio of public investment
to GDP (0.02) pins down the ratio of public capital stock to annual GDP at 0.32 to match
the ONS data on the public capital stock and public investment. For the depreciation
rate of private capital we follow Harrison and Oomen (2010) and choose δ = 0.025,
which implies an annual depreciation rate of 10 per cent. The steady-state wage markup
parameter
(
ν
ν−1
)
is set to 1.05 as in Christiano et al. (2005). The share of capital in
the production function (α) is calibrated to 0.30, which results in a steady-state share
of labour income in total output of 70 per cent as in Harrison and Oomen (2010). The
calibration of α, together with the value of the capital tax rate
(
τk
)
, and the private
capital depreciation rate, fixes the share of private investment expenditure in GDP at
15 per cent as in the UK data for the period from 1987:Q2 to 2011:Q1. Also the ratio of
private consumption to GDP (0.63) fits well the data for the sample period. The elasticity
of output to public capital (σg) is set to 0.01 which is within the range of estimates in
the literature (for more details see Sthler and Thomas (2012) and references therein).
We select the steady-state values of effective tax rates so that they match the cor-
responding rates implied by the data for the sample period. This implies 20 per cent
for the VAT (consumption tax rate: τ c), and 29 per cent for the labour and capital tax
15For solution, estimation and necessary calculations, we use Dynare 4.2.4 by Adjemian et al. (2011)
and MATLAB.
11
Table 1: Calibrated parameters and steady-state ratios
Share/Paramenter Definition Value
A. Expenditure shares
C/GDP Private consumption to GDP ratio 0.63
I/GDP Private investment to GDP ratio 0.15
G/GDP Gov. consumption to GDP ratio 0.20
IG/GDP Gov. investment to GDP ratio 0.02
B. Production sector
α Share of capital in production function 0.30
δ Private capital depreciation rate 0.025
δg Public capital depreciation rate 0.015
σg Elasticity of output to government investment 0.01
C. Taxes and fiscal policy
τ c Consumption tax rate 0.20
τ l Labour tax rate 0.29
τk Capital tax rate 0.29
TR/GDP Transfers to GDP ratio 0.17
b/GDP Annualised gov. debt to GDP ratio 0.60
D. Other calibrated parameters
β Discount factor 0.99
ν
ν−1 Steady-state wage markup 1.05
rates
(
τ l, τk
)
. 16
A share of public consumption and public investment in GDP is calibrated respec-
tively at 20 per cent and 2 per cent to match their empirical counterparts over the sample
period. The endogenous public transfers to GDP ratio is pinned down at approximately
17 per cent.
3.2 Prior Distributions
Assumptions about priors are presented in Table ?? and ??. Priors are set in line with
the existing studies. We use inverse gamma priors for standard deviations of shocks,
with prior means set to 0.01, except for investment shocks where we set the prior means
to 0.1.17
16The model share of taxes in the total tax revenue are 0.49, 0.21, 0.30 for labour, capital and con-
sumption tax respectively. For the period from 1987:Q2 to 2011:Q1 data show these averages to be 0.46
(42, 52), 0.25 (20, 27), 0.30 (25, 32) - brackets show minimum and maximum values respectively.
17We follow Harrison and Oomen (2010) and set the means of investment shocks at a higher level.
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We select a beta distribution for shock persistence parameters with prior means set
to 0.8 and standard deviations to 0.1. In line with Coenen et al. (2013) we select
normal distribution priors for all fiscal policy response parameters. The parameters
controlling the response of fiscal policy instruments to GDP have prior’ means set to
0.5 and standard deviations to 0.5, whereas debt aversion parameters have prior means
set to 0.2 and standard deviations to 0.1. We use a beta distribution for the share of
non-Ricardian households with a prior mean of 0.3, close to the estimates of Ratto et
al. (2009) and Coenen et al. (2013). We choose the prior mean of the habit formation
parameter to 0.7, similarly to the estimate of Harrison and Oomen (2010) for the UK.
The prior mean of constant relative risk aversion is set to 0.66, as in Harrison and Oomen
(2010). For the prior mean of the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour, we choose a value
of 1, as in Christiano et al. (2005). Turning to the monetary policy rule, for the degree
of interest rate smoothing parameter we select a beta distribution with a prior mean
equal to 0.7, whereas for the Taylor rule coefficients on inflation and output we select a
normal distribution and set prior means respectively to 1.5 and 0.125 as is standard in
the literature. The prior means for the price and wage indexation parameters are set to
0.3, whereas the prior mean of the Calvo price and wage stickiness parameters is fixed
at 0.5 with a standard deviation of 0.1. Finally, we select the normal distribution prior
for the capital adjustment cost with the mean set to 4, as in Smets and Wouters (2003),
and choose a normal distribution prior for the utilisation parameter with a mean of 0.8
and a standard deviation of 0.2.
3.3 Posterior Estimates
The details of posterior estimates of the model presented in Section 2 are in columns
5−8 of Table ?? and ??. In this subsection we discuss posterior means. According to the
results, agents exhibit a moderate degree of habit formation in consumption (b = 0.71) ,
which is similar to the value of 0.59 found in Millard (2011) and 0.69 in Harrison and
Oomen (2010). The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution coefficient is
estimated at 0.95. The above estimates imply that the elasticity of Ricardian households’
consumption with respect to the short-term ex ante real interest rate is equal to 0.31
and is close to the value of 0.47 obtained by Harrison and Oomen (2010) and somewhat
lower than 0.66 found in Millard (2011).18
The investment adjustment cost parameter is estimated at 6.39, similar to 6.71, a
value obtained for the euro area by Adolfson et al. (2008). The parameter governs
the transmission mechanism from the price of installed capital to investment.19 The
parameter can be interpreted as the inverse elasticity of investment with respect to an
increase in the installed capital.20 Its estimate implies that a 1 per cent increase in the
18This result stems from the transformation of the consumption equation to Cˆr,t = bCˆr,t−1 −
(1−b)
σc
∑+∞
i=0 (Rt+i − pic,t+i+1), where we have neglected the preference shock.
19The presence of investment adjustment costs in this form improves the performance of the model by
inducing hump-shape responses of the investment (for more discussion, please see Burnside et al., 2004
and Christiano et al., 2005).
20Disregarding shocks to the investment technology, the investment equation can be transformed to
Iˆt = Iˆt−1 − 1φ
∑+∞
i=0 β
iQˆt+i.
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price of capital is followed by a 1φ(1−β) = 15.65 per cent increase in investment. Smets
and Wouters (2003) estimate this elasticity at 16 per cent for the euro area, whereas
Christiano et al. (2005) estimate it at 38 per cent for the USA.
The capital utilisation adjustment parameter (κ = 0.77) can be defined as the inverse
elasticity of utilisation with respect to the rental rate of capital net of capital taxes. Our
result is higher than the value of 0.46 obtained by Millard (2011) and the value of 0.56
by Harrison and Oomen (2010) and is closer to 0.85 in Smets and Wouters (2007) and
0.77 in Edge et al. (2003) for the USA. The fixed cost parameter estimate (ϕy = 1.63)
is slightly higher than 1.46 in Christiano et al. (2005) and 1.50 in Smets and Wouters
(2003).21
The estimate of a price stickiness parameter (0.74) implies that prices change roughly
every 3.85 quarters. The Frisch elasticity of labour supply is equal to 1.31, which is
consistent with macroeconomic estimates, and implies that the labour supply is relatively
elastic with respect to the changes in real wages. The estimate of the wage stickiness
parameter (0.56) implies that wages adjust on average approximately every nine months,
which is similar to the results found by Millard (2011). Estimates of monetary policy
parameters take the following values: persistence parameter, (0.74); response to inflation,
(1.60); and the response to the output parameter, (0.12) and are in line with previous UK
data estimates. The share of non-Ricardian households is estimated to be 0.37 which is
consistent with estimates for EU and US (see for example Ratto et al., 2009). Turning to
the fiscal policy parameters, the most persistent fiscal policy shocks are the government
consumption shock with a half-life of 33 months, and the transfers shock with a half life
of 20 months. Tax shocks feature lower persistence with a half-life oscillating at around
(10) − (12) months. The least persistent is the public investment shock with a half-life
of only 3 months.22
The estimates of fiscal policy parameters are presented in Table ??. The 90 per cent
confidence intervals of some of them (response of transfers, consumption and labour
taxes to debt and GDP, and the response of capital taxes to debt) include 0 which
implies that these were not used systematically in the controlling for debt and GDP.
The parameter estimates imply that the government consumption, investment, and
capital income tax played the most important role in controlling the government debt
over the sample period, and that capital income tax rates and government investment
play an important role in controlling for the GDP fluctuations. In contrast, labour
income taxes do not respond strongly to the aggregate output.
21It can be shown that for fc = 1−mc
mc
Y, and mc = 1
x
, where x is a markup; ϕy =
(
1 + fc
Y
)
=(
1 + (1−mc)Y
mcY
)
= x. It also implies an elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods equal to 2.6
as κ = s
s−1 where (s) denotes the elasticity of substitution.
22The reason behind the low persistence of public, but also private investment, shock is the transfer of
nuclear reactors from British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (government investment) to the Nuclear Decommission-
ing Authority (business investment) in April 2005. This transfer (approximately equal to two-and-a-half
quarters expenditure on public investment) is a large one quarter shock which decreases the persistence
of the both investment shocks.
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3.4 Comparison of Models
Table 4: Model comparison
Marginal Likelihood
BVAR(1) 2128.64
BVAR(2) 2224.80
BVAR(3) 2215.66
BVAR(4) 2223.00
BVAR(5) 2268.31
BVAR(6) 2265.95
DSGE model 2369.51
To assess the fit of the model we compare it to the BVAR models of lag order
from 1 to 6.23 In the BVAR setup, we follow Juillard et al. (2006) and Ratto et al.
(2009) and set the prior decay parameter to 0.5, the tightness of the prior parameter
to 3, the parameter determining the weight on own-persistence to 2, and the parameter
determining the degree of co-persistence to 5. Table ?? presents the marginal likelihoods
of the estimates BVARs and indicates that the model similarly to Juillard et al. (2006)
and Ratto et al. (2009), yields better fit than the BVARs.
3.5 The role of frictions and other parameters
After confirming the good fit of the model we move to the analysis of frictions and
their role in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. Table ?? presents the posterior
mode’ estimates of nine models in which we either change the fiscal policy setup, turn
off the frictions (each one at a time), or change values of other parameters. Table ??
is a continuation of Table ?? and presents additionally the marginal likelihoods of the
estimated models and the implied GDP multipliers. The columns of both tables present
respectively results for the model: (1) of the benchmark economy, (2) in which fiscal
policy rules respond only to debt, (3) without habit formation, (4) without non-Ricardian
households, (5) without price stickiness, (6) without wage stickiness, (7) without variable
capital utilisation, (8) without capital investment adjustment cost.
Closer look at the fiscal policy related parameters indicates that these do not show
significant fluctuations with respect to the various specifications of the model (see Table
??). Namely, public consumption, investment and capital taxes always respond the
strongest to the level of debt and government investment and capital tax to GDP. Also,
the labour tax is characterised by the weakest response to debt and GDP fluctuations.
The marginal likelihoods’ values point toward three interesting observations. First,
the benchmark model is preferable than the models in which we exclude frictions. Sec-
ond, the model in which fiscal policy do not control for the GDP fluctuations yields only
slightly lower marginal likelihood (by 0.01) with respect to the benchmark model, sug-
gesting that the data are not very instructive about the model choice in this case. Third,
23For the discussion of BVAR see Doan et al. (1984) and Villemot (2011).
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the share of non-Ricardian households, the characteristic of the model which plays in
the literature an important role in explaining the response of private to public consump-
tion shock, plays along with the variable capital utilisation the least important role out
of the analysed frictions in the model. Also, the multipliers show that its implications
are far more important for transfers and the consumption and labour taxes, than for
government consumption.
The marginal likelihoods of the estimated models clearly indicate the frictions do
play a role in the performance of the model; in particular nominal frictions and capital
investment adjustment cost. It is important therefore to see what the role of these
frictions in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy is. We start by looking at the
habit formation in consumption (h), which has two implications for the model. First,
the weight on the past consumption increases, and second, the elasticity of consumption
with respect to the real interest rate decreases. As a result, presence of habit implies
that the response of Ricardian consumption takes a hump-shaped form. Therefore the
level of consumption following the shock is smaller on impact when compared to the
situation when habit is not present (for further discussion see Fuhrer, 2000, Woodford,
2003, and Christiano et al., 2005). Subsequently, higher levels of habit formation imply
lower short-term multipliers of consumption in absolute terms. Therefore, in the case
of a fiscal policy shock resulting in a positive (negative) response of consumption, as
the value of the parameter increases, the short-term responses of consumption become
smaller (higher), which results in a lower (higher) short-term GDP multiplier. In the
presented model expansionary fiscal policy conducted with spending instruments leads
to a decrease in consumption (see Figure 1), therefore absence of habit leads to lower
GDP multipliers (see Table 6), whereas expansionary fiscal policy conducted with tax
cuts leads a to higher consumption (see Figure 2), thus higher GDP multipliers (see
Table 6).
The share of non-Ricardian households (ϑ) determines the behaviour of total con-
sumption, which takes the form of Ricadian households’ consumption for ϑ = 0, and that
of non-Ricardian households for ϑ = 1. As the value of ϑ increases, and when fiscal pol-
icy shock results in the consumption response of rule-of-thumb households higher than
that of forward-looking households, the total consumption multiplier and subsequently
the GDP multiplier increases. In the presented model, the consumption’ response of
non-Ricardian households is greater in all the experiments, apart from the capital tax
cut (see Figure 1 and 2). As a result the model without non-Ricardian households yields
lower responses of consumption and therefore lower multiplier in all the cases apart form
the capital tax cut (see Table 6).
The price stickiness parameter ($p) governs the size of the elasticity of inflation with
respect to marginal costs. As Dixon and Rankin (1994) indicate, price stickiness makes
any policy that influences aggregate demand effective. When the price stickiness param-
eter is increased, the transmission mechanism from marginal costs to inflation is abated
(the elasticity of inflation with respect to the marginal costs decreases). Consequently,
for fiscal policy shocks resulting in the marginal cost increase, as the parameter’s value
increases, an increase in inflation becomes smaller. This implies a lower response of the
18
Table 5: Sensitivity of the estimated model to real and nominal frictions
Parameter bench− φ∗x,y= h = ϑ = $p = $w = κ = φk=
mark 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 10000 0.1
gov. con. resp. to debt φgb 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
gov. inv. resp. to debt φigb 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20
trans. resp. to debt φtrb 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08
cap. tax resp. to debt φtkb 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.11
con. tax resp. to debt φtcb 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10
lab. tax resp. to debt φtlb 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.01 -0.02
gov. cons. resp. to GDP φgy 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.16
gov. inv. resp. to GDP φigy 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.71
trans. resp. to GDP φtry 0.29 0.41 0.09 0.28 0.16 0.33 0.28
cap. tax resp. to GDP φtky 0.56 0.52 0.62 0.84 0.67 0.74 0.79
cons. tax resp. to GDP φtcy 0.15 0.33 -0.03 0.14 0.28 0.07 0.05
lab. tax resp. to GDP φtly 0.05 0.16 -0.08 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.03
AR(1) public cons. ρg 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
AR(1) public inv. ρig 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.44
AR(1) transfers ρtr 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
AR(1) capital tax ρtk 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.80
AR(1) cons. tax ρtc 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75
AR(1) labour tax ρtl 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.81 0.74 0.72
AR nominal interest rate ρ 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.57 0.72 0.63
inflation response ρpi 1.62 1.62 1.52 1.64 1.62 1.85 1.64 1.54
output response ρy 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.25
inverse elast. of labour σL 1.28 1.27 1.36 1.22 1.30 1.06 1.27 1.32
CRRA coefficient σc 0.97 0.99 1.29 1.04 0.98 0.73 0.99 1.09
investment adjust. cost φ 6.32 6.32 6.06 6.33 6.25 5.92 6.23
capital utilization cost κ 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.79 1.03 0.88 0.89
price index γp 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.21 0.03 0.08
wage index γw 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.36 0.23 0.16
calvo prices $p 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.74 0.39 0.71 0.60
calvo wages $w 0.52 0.52 0.63 0.47 0.55 0.52 0.60
habit formation h 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.61 0.44 0.63 0.57
fixed cost ϕ 1.61 1.62 1.61 1.57 1.70 1.66 1.62 1.63
share of non-Ricardians ϑ 0.35 0.32 0.60 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.46
AR(1) tfp. ρA 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.90 0.98 0.92
AR(1) preferences ρB 0.73 0.73 0.87 0.72 0.79 0.81 0.74 0.85
AR(1) private inv. ρI 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.24 0.39 0.82
AR(1) wage markup ρW 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.89 0.33 0.29
AR(1) price markup ρP 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.83 0.83 0.50 0.60∗ where x ∈ {g, ig, tr, tc, tl, tk}
nominal interest rate and, subsequently a less contractionary effect on the economy.
Hence, for fiscal policy shocks which induce an increase in marginal costs, higher levels
of price stickiness result in a higher GDP multiplier (as the transmission mechanism to
inflation is abated). However, in the case of the shocks which result in a decrease in
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Table 6: Sensitivity of the estimated model to real and nominal frictions
Parameter bench− φ∗x,y= h = ϑ = $p= $w= κ = φk=
mark 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 10000 0.1
tfp. σA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
pref. σB 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07
inv. σI 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 1.46
wage σW 0.38 0.37 0.77 0.27 0.42 0.02 0.37 0.63
price σP 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02
gov. cons. σG 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
gov. inv. σIG 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55
trans. σTR 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
cap. tax σTK 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
cons. tax σTC 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
lab. tax σTL 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
mon. pol. σM 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Marginal
Likelihood 2529.72 2529.71 2518.76 2522.71 2486.38 2457.74 2523.35 2474.49
Gov. cons. mtp.
Q1 0.96 1.02 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.75 0.88 0.58
Q4 0.75 0.80 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.56 0.67 0.19
Q12 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.35 0.40 -0.03
Q20 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.18 0.22 -0.15
Gov. inv. mtp.
Q1 1.08 1.18 1.09 0.99 0.98 0.85 1.01 0.79
Q4 0.97 1.06 1.00 0.89 0.89 0.64 0.91 0.39
Q12 0.81 0.89 0.83 0.76 0.79 0.46 0.77 0.26
Q20 0.76 0.83 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.33 0.71 0.22
Trans. mtp.
Q1 0.29 0.28 0.47 0.01 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.24
Q4 0.21 0.21 0.38 -0.02 0.20 0.02 0.19 0.06
Q12 0.05 0.05 0.18 -0.12 0.04 -0.13 0.05 -0.10
Q20 -0.08 -0.07 0.04 -0.22 -0.10 -0.30 -0.08 -0.19
Cons. tax mtp.
Q1 -0.51 -0.52 -0.93 -0.21 -0.50 -0.53 -0.48 -0.36
Q4 -0.60 -0.62 -0.82 -0.35 -0.58 -0.62 -0.55 -0.17
Q12 -0.50 -0.53 -0.58 -0.33 -0.47 -0.42 -0.43 0.03
Q20 -0.35 -0.37 -0.43 -0.20 -0.32 -0.20 -0.27 0.13
Cap. tax mtp.
Q1 -0.45 -0.51 -0.35 -0.55 -0.81 -0.94 -0.04 -0.73
Q4 -0.57 -0.65 -0.40 -0.67 -0.92 -1.28 -0.05 -0.99
Q12 -0.66 -0.77 -0.38 -0.79 -0.82 -1.49 -0.03 -0.71
Q20 -0.59 -0.71 -0.25 -0.75 -0.71 -1.56 0.01 -0.54
Lab. tax mtp.
Q1 -0.33 -0.33 -0.57 -0.04 -0.33 -0.52 -0.32 -0.29
Q4 -0.31 -0.31 -0.50 -0.07 -0.34 -0.86 -0.31 -0.17
Q12 -0.26 -0.28 -0.35 -0.11 -0.32 -1.07 -0.30 -0.10
Q20 -0.19 -0.22 -0.24 -0.07 -0.26 -1.13 -0.26 -0.03
marginal costs, higher levels of price stickiness result in lower GDP multipliers. In the
presented model marginal cost increases in all the cases apart form the income taxes.
Therefore for these instruments the low level of nominal stickiness (0.01) implies stronger
responses of nominal interest rates which puts downward pressure on the expenditure
of Ricardian households and results in lower GDP multipliers. On the other hand, for
income tax cut low level of nominal stickiness results in stronger decrease of nominal
interest rate and therefore higher GDP multipliers.
The wage stickiness parameter ($w) governs the size of the elasticity of the real wage
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rate with respect to the wage markup (the difference between the real wage and the wage
that would prevail under the flexible wage setup). A higher parameter indicates lower
elasticity; therefore, wage becomes less dependent on the markup. Changes in the wage
are passed on primarily through two channels: the labour income (mainly implies changes
in the consumption of the rule-of-thumb customers) and through the inflation channel
(mainly implies changes in the interest rate sensitive consumption and the investment
of optimising households). The effect on GDP multiplier depends on which channel
prevails.
The capital utilisation adjustment parameter (κ) determines the elasticity of utilisa-
tion with respect to the rental rate of capital net of capital taxes. As κ→∞ the model
is characterised by the full capital utilisation, whereas when κ → 0 capital utilisation
becomes more responsive to changes in rental rate. Presence of capital utilisation in the
model dampens the fluctuations in marginal costs as fluctuations in rental rate of capital
are smaller i.e. the lower the parameter the lower the deviation of marginal cost in ab-
solute terms and subsequently inflation and real rate, also in absolute terms. Therefore
in the presented model, if we set κ to a high level then rental rate and subsequently
real rate become more responsive to fiscal policy shocks, but capital utilisation does not
change. Because it takes long time for capital to accumulate, the multipliers decrease.
This is visible in particular in the case of capital tax rate cut, where this channel plays
an important role.
The investment adjustment cost parameter (φ) governs the size of the elasticity of
investment with respect to the Tobin’s Q. The higher the parameter, the lower the elas-
ticity, therefore investment becomes less dependent on the price of capital. Consequently,
lower values of the parameter increase the response of investment, leading subsequently
to higher multipliers. In the presented model only capital tax cut results in the positive
response of price of capital. Therefore absence of this friction in this case results in a
much stronger response of investment, and therefore higher GDP multiplier (see Table
6). On the other hand, in the remaining cases Tobin’s Q decreases, therefore absence of
the friction results in lower response of investment and therefore lower GDP multipliers.
4 Impulse-response functions and fiscal multipliers
This section discusses impulse-response functions and present value multipliers of the
fiscal policy shocks in the closed-economy setup. To enable comparability across the
figures, for the impulse of public spending, investment, and transfers, we use shock
equal to a 1 per cent of the steady-state value of GDP. In the case of tax rates we
calibrate a standard deviation of shock such that the initial change in the particular tax
revenue is equal to a 1 per cent of the steady-state value of GDP.
On each graph presenting impulse-responses, the horizontal axis denotes time in
quarters, and the vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation from the steady-state.
For each shock, we also provide cumulative present value multipliers of GDP, private
consumption and private investment for the short-term (first quarter and four quarters)
and the longer term (twelve and twenty quarters). Multipliers are calculated as in
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Mountford and Uhlig (2009) with the following formula:
PVt =
∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0R
−1
t+i
)
∆Yt+j∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0R
−1
t+i
)
∆Xt+j
(34)
where Xt =
{
G, IG, TR, τ cinc, τ
k
incτ
l
inc
}
.
4.1 Government spending
The dynamics implied by public consumption, investment and transfers shock are pre-
sented in Figure 1. The model predicts that the government consumption shock results
in a persistent increase in the government’s demand for goods and services. The in-
creased demand for goods and services leads subsequently to a higher capital utilisation
and an increase in a demand for labour, which put upward pressure on the capital
rental rate and the wage rate.24 The subsequent increase in the marginal cost translates
into a higher inflation. Both, higher inflation and an increase in output imply that the
monetary authority increases the nominal interest rate.
Consumption of non-Ricardian households increases due to an increase in the labour
income. Forward-looking households cut on the interest rate sensitive consumption and
investment. Total consumption decreases as Ricardian households are in majority. An
increase in government spending leads to an increase in the government’s deficit, debt,
and is subsequently followed by the fiscal policy reversal.
Our results can be compared with the empirical study of fiscal policy in the UK
conducted by Perotti (2005), who estimates the impulse-responses of private investment
to be significantly negative, which is in line with the results implied by our model.25
He obtains a positive and significant response of the ex ante real interest rate, which is
in line with this study and a negative response of inflation, which is not the case here.
Perotti (2005) estimates the cumulative response of consumption to be negative in the
fourth quarter but positive in the twelfth quarter. In both cases, the responses are not
statistically significant.26
24Consumption of Ricardian households decreases strongly in response to public consumption shock,
what makes these households more willing to supply labour. This effect prevails over the higher labour
demand, therefore the wage rate decreases.
25Perotti (2005) uses the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach to estimate, among
others, the effect of a government spending shock on key macroeconomic variables in the US, the UK
and the euro area. He divides his sample into two parts, one from 1963:1 to 1979:4 and the second from
1980:1 to 2001:2, and reports cumulative responses in the fourth and twelfth quarters. We compare our
results with the results based on the sample from 1980:1 to 2001:2, as this period is closer to our sample.
26The response of consumption to the government spending shock is discussed widely in the literature.
Our result is similar to those of Harrison et al. (2005), Harrison and Oomen (2010) and models estimated
on the euro area data (see for example Coenen and Straub, 2005, and Ratto et al., 2009). It must be
noted that it differs from Gali et al. (2007) who built a small DSGE model in which they obtain
a positive response of consumption to a government spending shock. However, these authors assume
flexible wages and calibrate the weight on the non-Ricardian households to 0.5. It is possible to obtain
a positive response of consumption in our model by imposing flexible wages and increasing the weight
of non-Ricardian households.
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Figure 1: Impulse-responses for expenditure shocks
The blue line (-) relates to public investment, the black line (- -) relates to public consumption, and the
red line (.) to public transfers.
Columns 2− 4 of Table ?? provide present value multipliers of output, consumption
and investment for the closed-economy model. The magnitudes of the government spend-
ing multipliers differ significantly in the literature. Ramey (2011) conducts a literature
review on the impact of government spending on GDP in the USA and concludes that
the estimates of deficit-financed government spending multiplier lie somewhere between
0.8 and 1.5. In the context of the UK, our benchmark economy setup implies the impact
government spending multiplier of 0.97. This result is slightly higher than the average
impact multiplier obtained in an empirical study on fiscal policy in the UK conducted
by Canova and Pappa (2011), (0.89). When longer horizon is considered, the multiplier
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becomes smaller. Present value multiplier of consumption and investment remains neg-
ative over the longer horizon. This finding is consistent with Ramey (2012), who reports
that government consumption crowds out total private expenditure on consumption and
investment.
The main difference between the effects of the public investment and public consump-
tion shock is that the former, apart from an increase in the aggregate demand leads also
to a rise in the public capital, which subsequently results in an increase in the supply of
monopolistic producers and puts downward pressure on prices.27 The impact increase in
the capital utilisation rate and the demand for labour is stronger than in the case of the
government consumption shock. The rental rate of capital increases on impact, and the
wage rate is above the steady-state following the positive public investment shock (the
increase in the wage rate is related to an increase in Ricardian households’ consumption,
which causes that these households are less willing to supply labour, driving therefore,
the wage rate up).
The marginal cost initially increases stronger than in the case of a public consumption
shock. The increase in the ex ante real interest rate is also larger only at the outset.
Afterwards, as public capital accumulates, marginal cost, inflation and the nominal
interest rate are below the levels implied by the government consumption shock.
The interest rate sensitive private investment is initially crowded out but is above the
steady-state level in around four years. Traum and Yang (2015) and Baxter and King
(1993) obtain a positive response of investment in the USA. Such a result is possible to
obtain in our model with higher values of the elasticity of output to the public capital.
Similarly to Ratto et al. (2009) we obtain a positive response of total consumption
to a public investment shock.28 The main reason behind this is that the response of
Ricardian households’ consumption is positive in less than eight quarters and that the
initial crowding out effect is relatively small. Moreover, the consumption of rule-of-
thumb households increases strongly on impact. An increase in the elasticity of output
to public capital, or the share of non-Ricardian households results in an even stronger
response of total consumption.
The values of government investment multipliers are clearly higher than that implied
by government consumption. The effects on GDP and private investment are the highest
out of all three public spending instruments.
The direct implication of a transfer shock is an increase in consumption of non-
Ricardian households (Ricardian households smooth consumption). Subsequent increase
in demand leads to a short-lived increase in the capital utilisation and the labour demand.
The capital rental rate increases, whereas the wage rate decreases. In the context of
Ricardian households’ expenditure, the increase in the real interest rate implies that
they cut on consumption and investment.
The GDP multiplier is less favourable when compared with multipliers implied by the
remaining government spending instruments. The reason is that transfers have positive
27The presence of public capital in the production function implies that from a perspective of a firm
an increase in public investment is analogous to an increase in total factor productivity.
28Ratto et al. (2009) estimate their model on the euro area data.
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influence just on the consumption of non-Ricardian households who comprise only a
fraction of households. The increase of the share of non-Ricardian households leads to
higher multipliers implied by the shock to transfers. It needs to be noted though that
the multiplier is similar to that in McKay and Reis (2016).29 Given the results presented
in Table 7 the spending side effects are much stronger than that reported in Jha et al.
(2014) for developing economies.
4.2 Government Revenue
The dynamics implied by consumption tax, labour and capital tax shock are presented
in Figure 2.30 A decrease in the consumption tax rate results in a fall in consumer prices
lasting approximately 7 months. Consequently, the consumption of both optimising
and non-optimising households increases. Higher demand for goods, implied by the
consumption tax cut, results in an increase of the demand for labour and a higher
capital utilisation.
A decrease in the consumption tax leads to an increase in output. Government debt
increases; therefore, the total government’s expenditure on transfers, public consumption
and investment decreases. A decrease in the consumption tax leads to a long-lasting fall
in private investment. Table ?? includes present value multipliers for consumption tax
shocks. In the short-term, a consumption tax cut induces relatively high multipliers for
consumption and GDP.31 Whereas the cumulative consumption multiplier increases over
time, the GDP multiplier drops in the longer horizon.
The instant effect of a decrease in the capital income tax rate is the reallocation of
production inputs from labour to capital, which results in a higher capital utilisation
and a lower labour demand. The lower demand for labour puts downward pressure
on the wage, which is more than offset by the increase of consumption of Ricardian
households. The marginal cost decreases as a result of the fall in the rental rate of capital.
This is followed by a decrease in inflation and the nominal interest rate. Consumption
of non-optimising households decreases due to a drop in labour income, whereas the
interest-rate-sensitive investment and consumption of Ricardian households increases.
A decrease in the capital income tax rate is also characterised by a substantial increase
in a capital utilisation cost. Table ?? presents multipliers of the capital income tax,
which can be compared to the results of Leeper et al. (2010a) and Leeper et al. (2010b).
GDP multiplies remain high irrespective of the period of consideration.
The instant effect of a decrease in the labour tax is the reallocation of production
29McKay and Reis (2016) look at the effects of fiscal stabilisers on the dynamics of the business cycle.
Their model differs from a standard new-Keynesian DSGE model as it is a merge of a new-Keynesian
model with the standard incomplete-markets model of consumption and inequality.
30The results can be compared to Cloyne (2013) who estimates the average effects of exogenous tax
changes on the UK economy. For the period from 1979Q2 to 2008Q1 (the closest to the period that
we use in our estimation) Cloyne (2013) obtains impact multiplier of 0.47, with the peak multiplier of
2.47. Whereas the impact multiplier is in line with our estimates, the peak multipliers estimated (not
reported here, as we report cumulative multipliers) in this study are lower in magnitude.
31Note that in contrast to public spending multipliers where plus is a desired sign of a multiplier
(increase in spending leads to an increase in GDP), in the case of taxes minus is the desired sign (an
increase in a tax leads to fall in GDP).
25
Figure 2: Impulse-responses for tax shocks
The blue line (-) relates to labour income tax cut, the black line (- -) relates to consumption tax cut,
and the red line (.) to capital income tax cut.
inputs from capital to labour, leading to an increase in a labour demand. The labour tax
cut has a positive impact on GDP and households’ disposable income. The consumption
of both types of households increases. The increase among the non-optimising households
is stronger, as labour income is the main determinant of their consumption. Inflation
falls as a result of a lower marginal cost. The model predicts that as a result of a decrease
in the labour tax, private investment increases. A decrease in the labour tax results in a
lower expenditure of government on consumption, transfers and investment. The GDP
multiplier is lower than in the case of the capital tax. The multiplier would yield higher
values for higher levels of non-Ricardian households (stronger effect on consumption)
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and lower nominal rigidities (stronger downward pressure on the nominal interest rate).
Also, more volatility due the changes in capital income tax than in the labour income
tax is due to more impacts of capital income taxes on investment and the accumulation
of physical capital.32
5 Extensions
5.1 Public consumption in utility
It is not a surprising result that public consumption yields lower multipliers than pub-
lic investment due to the supply side effects that public investment generates. The
benchmark assumption that households do not receive utility from public goods may
be perceived as unrealistic. Therefore we relax it by assuming that government con-
sumption is no longer treated as a wasteful spending by households, but enters in their
non-separable utility function, which now becomes:
E0
∞∑
t=0
εBt β
t
(
1
1− σcX
ι(1−σc)
t −
εLt
1 + σl
(Lιt)
(1+σl)
)
(35)
Xιt =
[
a (Cιt −Ht)
µ−1
µ + (1− a) (Gt −Hg,t)
µ−1
µ
] µ
µ−1
(36)
where Xt denotes effective consumption, H = hCt−1 and Hg = hgGt−1. This spec-
ification is similar to that of Bouakez and Rebei (2007) and Leeper et al. (2010a).
The implementation of public consumption into the utility as in equation (35) results
in changes in two equations; first is the consumption equation of Ricardian households
(37), and the second is the equation determining the wage markup (38)
Cˆr,t = n ∗
 µ
[
Rˆt − Etpˆic,t+1 + EtεˆBt+1 − εˆBt
]
+ (1−f)(1−µσc)1−hg
[
EtGˆt+1 − (1 + hg) Gˆt + hgGˆt−1
]
+
1
1 + h
EtCˆr,t+1 +
h
1 + h
Cˆr,t−1 (37)
Xwt = wˆt − σlLˆt −
1− (1− µσc) f
µ (1− hc)
[
Cˆr,t + hCˆr,t−1
]
+
(1− f) (1− µσc)
µ (1− hg)
[
Gˆt − hgGˆt−1
]
− τ
c
1 + τ c
τˆ ct −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t (38)
32We have also conducted experiments in which we apply expansionary fiscal policy in an economy
where each steady-state tax rate is increased at a time by 10%. The results are not very sensitive to
such changes. This leads to a slightly higher tax multipliers (in absolute terms) in the analysed period.
For consumption taxes the Q4 multiplier is -0.56 and the Q20 multiplier is -0.34; for labour taxes the
Q4 multiplier is -0.32 and the Q20 multiplier is -0.25; for capital taxes the Q4 multiplier is -0.54 and the
Q20 multiplier is -0.56.
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where:
n=
[
1
(1− µσc) f − 1
]
(1− h)
(1 + h)
< 0
f =
a (Cr (1− h))
µ−1
µ
a (Cr (1− h))
µ−1
µ + (1− a) (G (1− hg))
µ−1
µ
∈ < 0, 1 > and,
pˆic,t+1 = pˆit+1 − τ
c
1 + τ c
τˆ ct +
τ c
1 + τ c
τˆ ct+1
The elasticity of substitution between public and private consumption (µ) takes
values from 0 to∞. Equation (37) implies that as the elasticity of substitution increases
(µ→∞) the weight on the ex ante real interest rate in the consumption units increases,
whereas the weight on the government consumption
(
(1−f)(1−µσc)
(1−hg)
)
decreases. Therefore,
for higher levels of the elasticity the ex ante real interest rate remains a dominant
force in determination of Ricardian households’ consumption. When µ> 1σc private and
public spending are Edgeworth substitutes and increase in public consumption leads
directly to a decrease in private expenditure of Ricardian households. Public and private
consumption are Edgeworth complements when µ < 1σc , and in that case increase in
public consumption have positive impact on private consumption through the analysed
channel. Similar effects can be noted in the case of the wage markup. When µ> 1σc
any increase in public spending has a negative effect on the wage. On the other hand,
small values of µ imply a positive effect of public consumption on the wage; therefore,
an increase in the wage is associated with an increase in the consumption expenditure.
Interestingly, strong complementarity of public and private consumption can imply an
increase in the wage rate and consumption in response to a public consumption shock.
The second parameter determining the effects of public consumption expenditure
on private is the share of public consumption in total consumption 0 < (1− a) < 1.
When a = 0 ⇒ f = 0 total consumption of Ricardian households is public and when
a = 1⇒ f = 1 total consumption is private. Clearly the lower the level of a the higher
the effects of public on private consumption, as (1−f)(1−µσc)(1−hg) increases.
Finally, positive effect of public on private consumption can be achieved by assum-
ing high value of habit formation in government consumption (hg) which results in a
significant weight on public consumption variables in equation 37 and 38.
The results of estimation are presented in Table ?? and ??.33 The habit formation
parameter is estimated to 0.68, the elasticity of substitution to 1.08, and the share
parameter to 0.76. Table ?? shows present value GDP multipliers for the estimated
model with government consumption in utility.
33We set the prior mean for the share of public good in consumption (a) to 0.75, a level calibrated by
Coenen et al. (2013) for the euro area. We set the beta prior mean for habit formation (hg) to 0.7 and a
standard deviation of 0.1. For the elasticity of substitution (µ) we select gamma distribution prior with
a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 0.5.
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Multipliers do not differ much from the benchmark calibration implying that model
with non-separable non-wasteful public consumption in utility does not introduce signif-
icant changes in contrast to results of Coenen et al. (2013) for the euro area. In fact, the
estimates imply that the GDP multiplier for the public consumption shock is lower than
in the case when public consumption does not enter utility because (1− µσc) < 0. For
the remaining instruments the effect is negligible and naturally improving multipliers.
5.2 Open economy scenario
We also estimate an open-economy model of UK to analyse the implications of fiscal
policy with international trade. The small open-economy specification follows closely
Adolfson et al. (2008). We extend it by allowing for import of public consumption
and investment, (see on-line appendix for more details on the model). The estimation
results are presented in columns (13) − (16) of Table ?? and ?? respectively3435. The
estimates of price stickiness parameters in the importing sector are lower than in the
domestic sector as in Millard (2011). These estimates imply that prices of imports and
exports react to the changes in marginal costs roughly every 1.5 − 3 quarters. Low
estimates of all the price indexation parameters, ranging from 0.08 to 0.13, indicate that
the estimated Phillips curves are mostly forward-looking. The markups in the importing
industries in the private sector are higher than those in the public sector, suggesting that
the willingness to substitute among the imported goods in the private sector is relatively
lower than for the case of the public sector. Now we turn to the discussion of multipliers
in the open-economy (Table ??).
The GDP multipliers tend to be lower in the open-economy than in the closed-
economy as a fraction of the stimulus is diverted directly or indirectly to the rest of the
world through the import channel. The only exception is for capital taxes. A decrease
in capital taxes causes a drop in the inflation of domestically produced goods. It then
lowers not only the real interest rate but also causes a depreciation of real exchange rate
resulting in an increase in exports and GDP. The presence of this channel implies that
for capital taxes the GDP multiplier is higher in open than in the closed-economy.
A decrease in labour taxes also lowers the prices of domestically produced goods but
results in a lower GDP multiplier than in the closed-economy setup. There are two main
reasons behind it. First, wages are sticky therefore a drop in labour taxes is not passed
through so quickly to the marginal costs (and prices) as an equivalent drop in capital
34For the open economy model we generate four Markov chains of length 750,000.The acceptance ratios
are around 0.27. In the open-economy scenario we use additionally price of private consumption and
investment, price of public consumption and investment, nominal exchange rate and volume of export.
Data are detrended with their linear trends.
35We select the prior distribution for the price stickiness, price indexation, and markup related pa-
rameters in the import and export markets analogously to the domestic producers. The priors on the
remaining parameters are set as in Adolfson et al. (2008). We set the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and imported public investment to 1.5. Finally, we set the import-shares in aggregate public
and private consumption and public and private investment to match the data from the input-output
analytical tables for the UK. The shares of imports in consumption investment and public consumption
equal 22 per cent, 32 per cent and 11 per cents respectively. The share of imports in public investment
is set to 16 per cent.
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taxes. Second, a decrease in capital taxes implies an increase in income of Ricardian
households who smooth consumption. In contrast a decrease in labour taxes leads to an
increase of income for both types of households, and non-Ricardian households spend it
instantly on consumption goods and services which also puts upward pressure on prices.
Therefore, the real exchange rate depreciation and an increase in export are smaller
than in the case of capital taxes. This, combined with the fact that part of the stimulus
is diverted indirectly through the import channel, implies that the GDP multiplier is
lower than in the closed-economy specification. In the case of consumption taxes and
public spending instruments the GDP multipliers are lower in the case of open-economy.
The effect is stronger for public consumption and investment because a fraction of the
stimulus is directly diverted from the economy. Also, the drop in the public investment
multiplier is relatively greater as the share of stimulus diverted from the economy is
higher for this fiscal instrument.
5.3 Zero lower bound on nominal interest rate
Table ?? presents also the results for the situation in which we impose a zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate.36 In general the results presented are consistent
with McKay and Reis (2016) who show that the automatic stabilizers are more effective
during a zero lower bound episode.37 The zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate
intensifies the stimulus in the case of public expenditure and consumption taxes. The
reason is that all four instruments stimulate the economy through the demand side and
therefore lead to a higher inflation. At the same time, the nominal interest rate remains
constant which implies that the real interest rate drops with higher inflation which
stimulates significantly the private expenditure. In the case of capital and labour income
taxes inflation decreases. Therefore, holding the nominal interest rate at a constant
level results in an increase of the real interest rate. This motivates Ricardian households
to cut on the current expenditure and save. In the open-economy specification, the
implications of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate are similar to that in
closed-economy. An expansionary fiscal policy conducted with spending instruments and
consumption taxes becomes more efficient, whereas that conducted with income taxes
becomes less efficient.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyses the implications of fiscal policy in the UK economy in an esti-
mated DSGE model over the period from 1987:Q2 to 2011:Q1. The parameter estimates
indicate that public investment, consumption and capital income taxes play the most
important role in controlling for the government debt over the sample period. Addition-
ally, capital income taxes and government investment characterise significant procyclical
response to GDP.
Our results show that independently whether we introduce public consumption into
36We obtain the results by holding the nominal interest rate at the zero level by ten quarters.
37McKay and Reis (2016) however do not look at the effectiveness of individual fiscal stabilizers, what
we do in this paper.
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the utility of households or not, or whether we consider closed or open-economy setup,
public consumption and public investment are the most effective fiscal instruments in the
short-run, whereas capital income tax and the public investment are such instruments
in the longer horizon. Public transfers yield relatively lower multipliers when compared
with the remaining fiscal policy instruments. The implication of the these results is that
cuts in government investment are the most harmful for the economy.
A zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate changes the results considerably.
It increases the effectiveness of consumption taxes and public expenditure instruments
independently whether we consider closed or open economy. On the other hand, income
taxes become the least effective instruments to stimulate the economy. The implication
of this result is that when nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound, cuts conducted
with spending instruments or consumption taxes are the most harmful for the economy,
whereas cuts conducted with income taxes are the least harmful for the economy.
Finally, we show that nominal and real frictions play an important role in the trans-
mission channel of fiscal policy. In particular we observe that non-Ricardian households
tend to make fiscal policy more effective. At the same time nominal rigidities (sticky
prices and wages) increase the effectiveness of public spending and consumption taxes
and decrease that of income taxes.
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A Data description, prior and posterior distribution
In order to estimate the benchmark model, twelve data series are used: GDP, consump-
tion, investment, wages, inflation, hours, government consumption, government invest-
ment, effective consumption, labour and capital tax rates, and transfers. The data are
from the Bank of England (BoE) and Office for National Statistics (ONS) webpages, and
cover period from 1987:Q2 to 2011:Q1. While some of the data series can be obtained
directly from the ONS, other including effective tax rates, and transfers were calculated
closely following Mendoza et al. (1994), Jones (2002), and Leeper et al. (2010). To
derive the effective tax rates on labour income,
(
τ l
)
, and capital income,
(
τk
)
, firstly
the average tax rate on income,
(
τ i
)
is calculated . The reason for it is that the ONS
does not distinguish between labour and capital income taxes.
The average income tax rate:
τ i =
IT +OCT
W + PI +GOS +MI
(39)
where IT denotes income taxes paid by households (HHLDs) and non-profit institu-
tions serving households (NPISHs) [QWMQ]; OCT stands for other current taxes paid
by HHLDs & NPISHs [NVCO]; W denotes wages and salaries of HHLDs & NPISHs
[QWLW]; PI denotes property income of HHLDs & NPISHs [QWME]; GOS denotes
gross operating surplus of HHLDs & NPISHs [QWLS]; MI stands for gross mixed income
of HHLDs & NPISHs [QWLT];
The effective labour tax rate:
τ l =
(W + 0.5 ∗MI) ∗ τ i + ESC
W + ESC
(40)
where ESC stands for employers social contributions of HHLDs & NPISH [QWLX];
(denominator comprises compensations of employees)
The effective capital tax rate:
τk =
(PI +GOS + 0.5 ∗MI) ∗ τ i + (ITG+OCTG− IT −OCT ) + CT +OTP
OS
(41)
where ITG stands for current taxes on income received by general government (GG)
[NMZJ]; OCTG stands for other current taxes received by the GG [NVCM]; CT denotes
capital taxes of HHLDs & NPISHs [NSSO]; OTP stands for other taxes on production
[NMYD];OCT stands for other current taxes OS stands for gross operating surplus of
the whole economy;
The effective consumption tax rate:
τ c =
TTP
C − TTP (42)
where TTP stands for total taxes on products (GG) [NVCC]; C stands for final con-
sumption expenditure of HHLDs & NPISHs.
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Transfers:
TRM = TRt +
[
TCMt + TL
M
t + TK
M
t − TRest
]
(43)
where
[
TCMt + TL
M
t + TK
M
t−1 − TRest
]
is a tax residual. TRt represents the sum of:
social benefits other than social transfers in kind (GG) [NNAD], other current transfers
(GG) [NNAN], subsidies (GG) [NMRL], total capital transfers (GG) [NNBC]. TCMt +
TLMt +TK
M
t denotes total tax revenue. TRest represents total resources and totals sum
of: gross operating surplus (GG) [NMXV], total taxes on production and import received
(GG) [NMYE], other taxes on production (GG) [NMYD], property income received (GG)
[NMYU], current taxes on income and wealth (GG) [NMZL], total social contributions
(GG) [NMZR], other current transfers (GG) [NNAA], total capital transfers receivable
(GG) [NNAY].
Public inv.: government gross fixed capital formation [RPZG];
Public cons.: total final consumption expenditure by general government [NMRP];
GDP: government investment+government consumption+private consumption+private
investment;
Private inv.: total gross fixed capital formation [NPQS]- government investment;
Private cons.: final consumption by households [ABJQ]+ final consumption by non-
profit institutions [HAYE]
Hours: Actual hours worked, Labour Force Survey [YBUS];
Wages: {Compensation of employees [DTWM]+0.5*(Mixed income [ROYH])} / (Hours
worked);
Inflation: first difference of GDP deflator [YBHA/ABMI]
For the open economy specification, we additionally use the following data:
Export: export of goods and services[IKBH]
Private consumption price inflation: first difference of private consumption deflator
[(ABJQ+HAYE)/ (ABJR+HAYO)]
Private investment price inflation.: first difference of private investment deflator
[(NPQS-RPZG)/ (NPQT-DLWF)]
Public cons. price inf.: first difference of public consumption deflator [NMRP/NMRY]
Public inv. price inf.: first difference of public investment deflator [RPZG/DLWF]
Nominal exchange rate: Quarterly average effective exchange rate index, Sterling
(XUQABK67)
Definition of variables:
X = ln
(
x
pop
)
∗ 100 (44)
where x = government investment, government consumption, transfers, GDP, private
consumption, private investment, hours, export; and pop is defined as all persons aged
16 and over table A02 [Labour Force Survey Summary]. As in Leeper (2010) all data
are detrended with their linear trend. We estimates the model also on the data de-
trended with Hodrick -Prescott filter(Canova (1998) shows many drawbacks of using the
Hodrick-Prescot filter as detrending method). In general we can say that multipliers
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calculated with the model in which parameters were estimated with the data detrended
with Hodrick-Prescott filter tend to be lower than in the case when linear detrending
method is applied. In the majority of the cases the difference is less than 0.1 and never
greater than 0.16, for cumulative multipliers at Q1, Q4, Q12, Q20.
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